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Downward Transfers, Completely Monotone Utility
and K-th Degree Stochastic Dominance
The classical Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion is strengthened here by
identifying greater risk with a downward transfer of the mass of the distribution, rather
than with variance. Downward transfers may be expressed as sequences of differences in
central moments. Utilities for which the risk premium is non-decreasing for all such
transfers are completely monotone. This result may then be used to derive stochastic
dominance rules up to any degree.
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Downward Transfers, Completely Monotone Utility,
and K-th Degree Stochastic Dominance
The measure of absolute risk aversion r(x) = -<y'^''^(x)/(/^' ^(x) , discovered
independently by Pratt [1964] and Arrow [1965], has played a central role in
the development of economic theory under uncertainty for more than two
decades. The measure, and the widely accepted hypothesis that it is non-
increasing in X
,
are not sufficient in themselves, however, to provide unam-
biguous answers to a number of issues involving economic behavior under
uncertainty. This has led to several extensions of the concept to make it
applicable to a wider class of problems.^
Pratt and Zeckhauser [1987] have recently proposed a strengthening of
the concept to "proper risk aversion", which requires that an undesirable
prospect should not be made desirable by the addition of an independent
undesirable prospect. Their results show a close, but not equivalent relation
between proper risk aversion and "completely monotone" utilities, which are
concave utilities whose higher derivatives alternate in sign. Our purpose in
this paper is to propose an alternative strengthening of absolute risk aversion
which yields completely monotone utilities. In addition to their theoretical
1 Among them are the extension by Kihlstrom and Mirman [1981] to multiple
^ p arguments in the utility function, and a strengthening of the concept by Ross
[1981] to allow base wealth x to be stochastic. A further extension by
Machina [1982] edlows the increment to wealth to be stochastic. The Ross
strengthening and extensions are discussed in Machina and Neilson [1988].
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interest, these utilities are of operational significance, since they permit the
derivation of stochastic dominance (SD) rules up to any desired degree, thus
expanding considerably the set of uncertain alternatives which may be ordered
under these expected utility criteria.
The original Pratt-Arrow measure, as well as the more recent stronger
measures of Ross [1981] and Machina and Neilson [1987] are derived by identi-
fying risk with variance, under the explicit assumption that other characteris-
tics of the relevant distributions are negligible. We derive our results using
a concept of risk which identifies greater risk with higher probabilities of
"worst-case" outcomes, rather than with variance. Our definition of an
increase in risk, which we term a "downward transfer" (DT) is developed in
Section I. An intuitive interpretation of this definition is that it corresponds
to a transfer of some of the mass of the distribution to the lower tail,
increasing the likelihood of the most adverse outcomes. We show that DT's
may be expressed as sequences of differences in the central moments. Such
sequences of moments appear to have been noted first by Fishburn [1980], but
have received relatively little attention from economic theorists.
In Section II the risk premium it corresponding to the DT concept is
derived. Necessary and sufficient conditions for n to be non-decreasing for
any DT imply complete monotonicity. In Section III the restrictions on utility
implied by complete monotonocity are exploited to obtain SD rules up to any
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arbitrary degree.^ These rules order a larger set of uncertain alternatives
than is possible using a second-degree rule, based on concavity, or a third
degree rule, for which non-increasing absolute risk aversion in the original
Pratt-Arrow sense is sufficient.
I. K-th Degree Downward Transfers
In the succeeding discussion we shall assume that the points of increase
of the relevant distribution functions are restricted to the closed interval
[£2,b]. As -a and b may be chosen to be arbitrarily large, this assumption
imposes little cost in terms of economic relevance and simplifies considerably
our argument. It is sufficient, moreover, for the existence of the moments of
the distributions up to any desired degree.
Consider the transfer of some of the mass of a distribution from a neigh-
borhood of the mean to the left or lower tail. More formally, define a down-
ward transfer of the first degree, or DT(1), of the density /(x) having a mean
M- , as a transformation of /(x) into g(x) such that g(x) = /(x) + /^oCx) , where
//o(x)^0, for x<n-€ , e>0, and //o(x)-Ofor x>n + e , with the first inequal-
ity strict for at least one x in [a.^i-e]. Hence //o(x)<0 for at least one x in
the half-open interval i\i- e .\l-*- e] .
2 Higher degree stochastic dominance relations have been discussed in Fish-
burn [1976, 1980] and Chew [1983]. Stochastic dominance in a more general-
ized nonlinear utility model, in contrast to expected (linear) utility theory is
examined by Fishburn [1988].
- 3 -
Defining recursively H k(.x)' a I "
^
(k-i)(x)dx, fc>l, it is apparent that
H,(x), which is the difference between the cumulative distributions 0(x) and
F{x)
, is non-negative on [a.b] , with //, (a) - H , (b) - . The original distribu-
tion thus dominates the transformed one by the First Degree Stochastic Domi-
nance (FSD) criterion, given below in Section III.^ The risky prospect under
/(x) will thus be preferred to g'(.v) by all individuals for whom utility is
increasing in x , The set of all DT(1) of /(x)is a proper subset of transfor-
mations which make /(x) preferred to g(x) by FSD. The inclusion is proper
since we have restricted the mass transferred to [a .[L-e]to be drawn from
(ji-e.|i*e]
.
In the context of this paper, the most important feature of a downward
transfer is its effect on the central moments of the two distributions. As the
decrease in the mean of g(x) relative to /(x) is obvious, we consider the
effect of the downward transfer on the variance and the higher central
moments of g(x) relative to /(x) . Expressing both distributions in terms of
deviations about their respective means, the difference between the k-th cen-
tral moments of g(x) and /(x) is
M/-Ji/ - ["x'dHdx) (1)
a J
or, since H i(x) is increasing on [a.-€] and is decreasing on (-€.&],
ji/-^/ - x/^J *dA/,(x)-X2* J*dW,(x)*x/ I'dHiCx) (2)
3 This criterion was originally discovered by Lehmann [1955] and introduced
into the economic literature by Quirk and Saposnik [1962].
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where x-i<-e<x-2<G, g>0. The third integral term on the RHS is zero, since
^o(^)- for >f >e . Hence
r V^^-Vif' = i^i'-^z'^J *dH,(x) (3)
As the integral in (3) is non-negative and lx,|>|x2|, (-l)V,' - ("OV/'» for
t^A:, the even central moments of g(x) are greater and the odd central
moments less than those of /(x) .
A DT(1) corresponds quite closely to what non-economists often mean by
an increase in risk. Economists and operations researchers, however, have
generally preferred to restrict comparisons of risky alternatives to situations
in which the means or other measures of location of the distributions are
equal, so that preference for one over the other is due to variance and other
characteristics of the distributions. One such characterization is the well-
known "mean preserving spread" (MPS) of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970]. The
MPS is a special case of Second Degree Stochastic Dominance (SSD), which
does not require equality of means.*
The addition of the restriction that the means be equal provides a defini-
tion of a downward transfer of the second degree, or DT(2), as a transfer of
some of the mass of the distribution from an e -neighborhood of the mean
downward to [a.-e]
, subject to n^'-n/. As was the case for a DT(1), the
4 SSD was discovered by Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya [1934] and was intro-
duced to economists, apparently independently of each other and of earlier
work, by Fishburn [1964], Hadar and Russell [1969], and Hanoch and Levy
[1969].
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probability of worst-case outcomes (i.e. x^-e ) is increased. The set of DT(2)
is a proper subset of MPS transformations, or of those transformations which
make /(x) preferred to g(x) by SSD. Once again, the inclusion is proper,
since we have constrained //o(-v) = Oon (e.b].
The downward transfer concept readily generalizes to higher orders, as
we successively restrict the variance and increasingly higher central moments
of the distributions to be equal:
Definition 1 : A downward transfer of the k-th degree, DT(k), is a
transformation of /(x)into g(x) such that Wo(x) = g(x)- /(x) > ,
for x5e , with strict inequality for at least one x in [a.-€]and
^o(>^)"Ofor ^>e, subject to n?' ° k^./ > where p-^'and M^^'are the ith
central moments of /(x)and g(.x) and i" I . ..(k- 1) ,
There is thus an increased probability of worst-case outcomes under g(x)
,
but shifts in mass on (€.-€] leave the means and second through (k-l)st
central moments unchanged.
The effects of downward transfers are less easily visualized as their
order increases. An example of a DT(3), however, is provided by the "mean-
variance-preserving transformation (MVPT) of Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler
[1980]. Consider the two point distribution gCx) in which Prob (x-0)-.25
and Prob (x-2)-.75. It differs from the two point distribution /(x) given
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by Prob (x-l)-.75 and Prob (x-3)-.25 by a DT(3), since both distributions
have a mean of 1.5 and a variance of .75, but the former one has a higher
probability of the worst-case outcome of zero. Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler
characterize g(x)as having "increased downside risk" and show that /(x)
would be preferred for 6dl utilities with a positive third derivative.
Higher order downward transfers may appear unusual, but in fact are
easily produced using a linear programming approach. Let the points of
increase x,, t= l,..fiof the discrete distributions /(x) and g(x) have probabil-
ities Pi^O and let a,(y)-x,^ y- 0, 1 , ...(fc- 1 ) . For DT(k) of second order or
higher, we assume that the x, are expressed as deviations about the mean.
Then gCx) differs from /(x) by a DT(k) if it is a solution to the linear pro-
gram
Maximize Pi ^ , Subject to
n R n
^p.a,(0)-l. XP'^'C1)-0, XPtac(2)-»i'
( ( (
n
...Y,P,a,ik-l)-ii';-'' (4)
f
As an example, Table 1 below shows the distribution /(x)and a series of
downward transfers ranging from a DT(1) through a DT(6) where x,--3, -2, ...
3, (i = 1..6), produced by maximizing the probability of -3, the worst case
outcome, subject to the increasing series of constraints on the moments.
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As is clear from the table, the higher degree DT*s differ from the original
distribution by less than do lower degree DT*s, a consequence of the imposi-
tion of the increasing constraints placed on the maximization problem. A
downward transfer, particularly a higher degree one, is a theoretical curiosum,
and not in itself a useful characterization of increasing risk in any practical
sense, since the progressive addition of the constraints on the moments
reduces the likelihood that such a pair of risky alternatives would ever be
observed. The downward transfer concept, moreover, is not as general a defi-
nition of increasing risk as are the MPS, MVPT, or various SD rules, since
each DT is a proper subset of the corresponding SD rule.
Table 1
K-degree Downward Transfers
x: -3 -2 -1 1 2 3
f(x) 1/8 3/4 1/8
f(x) + DT(1) 1
f(x) + DT(2) 1/2 1/2
f(x) + DT(3) 1/12 2/3 1/4
f(x) + DT(4) 1/18 8/9 1/18
f(x) + DT(5) 1/40 1/4 1/2 1/8 1/10
f(x) + DT(6) 1/48 5/16 1/3 5/16 1/48
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Downward transfers are, however, a fundamental theoretical construct for
isolating the effect of an increase in the probability of worst case outcomes on
all the moments of the distributions being compared, by impounding the
effects of successively higher moments. In this sense the DT is a natural
generalization of the idea of associating greater risk with less preferred
distributions when the means are equal, as is done with the MPS, or when the
first two moments are equal, as in the case of the MVPT. The DT makes
precise the notion that an increase in risk can be defined as a ceteris paribus
increase in the probability of the least desired outcomes, where the ceteris
paribus condition corresponds to the requirement that a successively larger
sequence of the lower moments of the two distributions be equal. The
usefulness of the DT concept derives from the fact that each DT is a proper
subset of a corresponding and more general increase in risk like the MPS or
MVPT. It therefore serves as minimum condition, in that it appears reasonable
to require that individuals who avoid worst-case outcomes at the very least
prefer /(x)to g^x)
,
where the latter differs from the former by a DT of any
degree. In the following section downward transfers are used to characterize
the utility function, under the hypothesis that the Pratt-Arrow risk premium
should not decrease with a downward transfer of any degree.
II. The Risk Premium and Higher Moments
Following Pratt [1964], we consider the local risk premium it such that an
individual would be indifferent between the risk 5 and the non-stochastic
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amount Ei2)-it , We maintain all of the assumptions of Pratt, except that we
shall not assume that moments of the third or higher orders are negligible.
Specifically, we shall assume that z has zero mean and is small in relation to
the individual's base wealth x , so that terms in Ji of second and higher order
may be ignored. The argument of this section assumes that x is non-
stochastic. This assumption may be relaxed, following Machina and Neilson
[1987], without essentially changing our argument. Throughout this and the
following section we assume that £'[6'^(x)] exists and is finite.
Indifference between the certain and uncertain prospect requires that
C/(x-ii) » £"[C/(x-2)] (5)
Expanding both sides of (5) about x , taking expectations of the RHS, and
dividing by -U^^\x)f yields
'-U^'\x)
n - Z .T>' ('^lU''\x) J
where ji' is the ith central moment of the distribution of z , since £"(2) = and
X is non-stochastic.
If the moments of £ beyond the second order are ignored, so that n= 2,
then for a given level of x the risk premium is linear in the variance of z.
Under this assumption, as Pratt and Arrow have shown, the term
r{x)' -U^^^{x)/U^^^{x)
, which is positive for all concave utilities, provides a
natural measure of the degree of absolute risk aversion. (
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The generally accepted hypothesis that r(x)is non-increasing in x is
sufficient, but not necessary for £/^^^(x)>0, a condition used by Whitmore
[1980] to derive a third degree stochastic rule (TSD). Although further
restrictions on the utility function might appear to have little meaningful eco-
nomic content, the DT concept developed in Section I provides a rationale for
such restrictions.
If we identify an increase in risk with any downward transfer, rather
than with variance alone, then under the plausible hypothesis that the risk
premium Ji should at least not decrease with an increase in risk, we can
restrict the set of utilities to completely monotone concave utilities. This is
the sense of Theorem 1 below, which shows that the hypothesis that the risk
premium is non-decreasing for all downward transfers is equivalent to assum-
ing that the derivatives of the utility function alternate in sign.
Theorem 1: Let ii(x.;g) be non-decreasing for all DT(k), A:- I .2..^ .
Then the utility function must satisfy the condition that
where i- 1 . .../i
.
i£) < (7)
Proof: The sufficiency of t/^'*"(x)/t/^'>(x) ^ for i-l....R and
n^ ^ n, when g(x) differs from /(x) by a DT(k) for any k> 1 follows
directly from (6), since t/^"> 0, and Definition 1 implies that
Ii/-H/, ii/»ji/, . . . ii/'-'^-|A/*-'>and (-l)'n, ' ^ {-\y^,\nk.
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To show the necessity of complete monotonicity for all i" 1 n
,
rather than simply that r^'>(>:) = -£/<^>(x)/i/<'^(>:) < , we show that
it is always possible to produce a utility function for which
r<''(x') < Obut (/^'*'^(x)/i/^'>(x) > on some subinterval of [a. 5] ,
for a given i ^ 3, so that when x is in this subinterval a DT(i)
implies that n^<Ji^
Let (j>(x) = -In t/^'^(x) . Since there is no danger of ambiguity in
notation, we denote the successive derivatives of <t)(><r) by 4>i <!>« •
Hence ^^^-^ -U^^^(x)/U^^^ " r{x) , Decreasing absolute risk aversion in
the conventional Pratt-Arrow sense requires that <t>2 " '"^'H*^) <0 • By
definition, 6^^'^(x) = e'*^*^ . Successive differentiation of i/^'^(x) yields
the higher derivatives of U{x) , each of which is the product of
e'^^^^and a function of the derivatives of <t>(x) .
The conditions (^i>Oand (^2<0 require that 6^^^^(x) <Oand
6'^^^(x)>0. For i^4 , however, the i/'^'^(x)may be of indeterminate
sign on [a.5]
, since they involve terms in at least <t)<-i and possibly
higher, which may be of arbitrary sign. As we may always choose a
function <|)(x)
,
subject to ^, >0 and 4>2<0 » >^e can produce a
concave, decreasingly absolute risk averse utility which is not com-
pletely monotone, thus proving Theorem 1.
An example may make the argument more concrete. Consider the utility
for which <^(x) - [PCysin x+ cosx)/(l + y^)~ci/y]c'^* • Despite its rather
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bizarre form, the corresponding utility is strictly concave and decreasingly
absolute risk averse for all a:^ if a > P > and P<y« . For appropriate a.|3
and y , each U^'\x), i^ 4, will vary in sign on [O.*") .
III. K-degree Stochastic Dominance
Let an individual with the utility function U(x) face the random prospects
1 and 2, whose densities we denote by /(x) and g(x) respectively. As before,
we assume that the random variable is bounded on [a.b]. The Von-Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility of the first prospect is then
£liy(x,)] - rV(x)df(x)
a J
(8)
with a corresponding definition for the second prospect. The first prospect is
thus preferred if
/•b
f[i/(-v,)]-f[i/(x3)] j i/(x)[/(x)-g(x)]dx
U {^x^dH ^{^x^ > (9)
Integrating by parts, and noting that W
,
(a ) - /y
,
(b) - ,
^[^(x,)]-£[{y(x.)] - f H,ix)U^'\x)dx > (10)
Since i/^'^(x)> 0, a sufficient condition for the first prospect to be preferred
is that
H,(x) > 0, Vxe[a,6] (11)
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with strict inequality for at least one xela.b] . This condition, which is
usually termed First Degree Stochastic Dominance, requires that the distribu-
tion Fix) lie wholly below G(x) at all points on [a.b] . For this reason FSD is
of limited practical usefulness in ordering risky alternatives, since the
distribution of any pair of non-identical prospects with equal means will inter-
sect at least once. In addition, as is the case for all lower-degree SD rules,
H i{x) must be evaluated at all points on [a.b]
A more slightly more powerful rule may be obtained from (10) by again
integrating by parts, yielding
1/ '\x)HAx)\' - ['u''\x)H,(x)dx (12)
For risk averse ( f/^'^(x)>0,t/^^^(x) <0 ) utilities, a sufficient condition for
preference for the first prospect is that
H2{x)>0, VxG[a,b] (13)
with strict inequality for at least one xe[a.t)] . This condition, or Second
Degree Stochastic Dominance (SSD) reduces to Rothschild and Stiglitz' "integral
conditions" for a mean-preserving spread when [l/ •= ji^' , since
Hzib) " H 2(a) = 0. The greater power of this rule, which orders a larger
set of uncertain prospects, results from the additional restriction that
U^^\x)<0 , Analogously to FSD, it requires the evaluation of H zix) for all
xe[a.b].
In the preceding section it was shown in Theorem 1 that the. hypothesis
that the risk premium it should be non-decreasing for any downward transfer
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implies complete monotonicity. The additional restrictions on utility permit the
derivation of SD rules up to any desired degree. Continued integration by
parts of (12) yields the general k-th degree expression for the difference in
the expected utilities, or E[U(Xf)] - £[iy(.Xg)],
-
-Y.i-\yu"'{b)H,,di>) - (-1)'*' rV^**'^(x)H,.,(x)dx (14)
The corresponding k-th degree SD rule based on (14) is thus that
f^k^)(x)<0. Vxrcfa.b] (15)
with strict inequality for at least one xe[a.t»] , and f/,(b)10, i= l,..A:.
A k-th degree SD rule is theoretically superior to lower degree SD rules
in that it orders a larger set of distributions. At an operational level, more-
over, it has an added advantage, since it reduces the choice between two
alternatives to an evaluation of the H,{b), t= l,..fconly at b , rather than
over all xe[a.b] . This follows from the fact that for finite expected utilities,
the residual integral term in (14) tends to zero as k increases, requiring that
only the sequence of H i{b) be non-negative (non-positive) for
£[£/(.v,)] > (<-) E[iy(x2)] . Since the M,(b) are linear in the means and cen-
tral moments of the distributions of the two prospects, the problem of
expected utility choice is reduced to a comparison of moments, provided that
they exist.
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